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Nov. 1949] ESTATE OF UARClA 
r34 C.2d flD: 210 P.2d 841) 
[8. F. No. 17770. In Bank. Nov. 1, 1949.J 
Estate of THERESA UARCIA,· Deceased. HENRY MAR· 
SHAlL. Appellant. v. M.ARY ROGERS, 88 ·AdminIstra· 
trix, etc., Respondent. 
[1) Decedents' Estates - Appeal- Orders Appealab!e.- An order 
denying petitioner's motion to amend his petition after a Judg· 
ment on the pleadings precluding hlm from participating as 
an heir in the distribution of an estate is not appealable under 
Prob. Code, § 1240, and an appeal from such order must be 
dismissed. 
[2] Adoption-By LegitimatioD-Eifect-lUght .to lDherit.-Civ. 
Code, § 230, relating to the adoption of an illegitimate ehild 
by the father's public acknowledgment and reception of the 
child into his family, is not qualified by Prob. Code, § 255, per· 
mitting an illegitimate child to inherit from the estate of the 
mother without exception, but from the kindred of the father 
only where its parents have intermarried and the tather has 
thereafter acknowledged or adopted it as legitimate; the two 
sections provide alternate methods by which a person may 
become the heir of his father. 
[S] Id.-By Legitimation-Effect-Right to lDherit.-With Tl'gard 
to inheritance from or through the fatheT, the words "illegiti. 
mate child" in Prob. Code, § 255, are applicable, not to every 
child who is born illegitimate, but only to children, born ille-
gitimate, who have not been legitimated under either section 
215 or section 230 of the Civil Code; hence the statutes are 
not in conflict. (Disapproving dictum of Supremt' Court to 
the contrary in its opinion on denial of hearing in Wolf v. Gall, 
32 Cal.App. 286, 163 P. 346, 350.) 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the 
City and County of San Francisco precluding petitioner from 
participating as an heir in distribution of an estate, and from 
an order denying motion to amend petition after judgment. 
Thomas M. Foley and George W. Schonfeld, JUdges. Judg-
ment reversed; appeal from order dismissed. 
[2J See 1 Cal.Jur.452. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Decedents' Estate:!, § 1129; [2, 3] 
Adoption, § 55. 
420 ESTATE OF GARCIA [34 C.2d 
Benjamin C. Mickle and A. B. Bianchi for Appellant. 
J. J. Henderson and Donald E. Wachhorst as Amici Curiae, 
on behalf of Appellant. 
Donahue, Richards, Rowell & Gallagher and A. R. Rowell 
for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Petitioner has appealed from a judgment 
entered on the pleadings precluding him from participating 
as an heir in the distribution of his paternal aunt's estate, as 
well as from an order denying his motion to amend his peti-
tion after judgment. [1] The order is not appealable under 
the provisions of section 1240 of the Probate Code, and the 
appeal therefrom must be dismissed. The petition on which 
judgment was entered again!>t petitioner on the pleadings 
alleged that although born the illegitimate son of decedent's 
brother, he had been legitimated by his father under the pro-
visions of section 230 of the Civil Code. Respondent, adminis-
tratrix of the estate of petitioner's aunt, con lends that under 
section 255 of the Probate Code petitioner cannot inherit 
any part of the aunt's estate because his parents never inter-
married. 
Section 230 of the Civil Code provides: "The father of an 
illegitimate child, by publicly acknowledging it as his own, 
receiving it as such, with the consent of his wife, if he is 
married, into his family, and otherwise treating it as if it were 
a legitimate child, thereby adopts it as such; and such child 
is thereupon deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time 
of its birth. The foregoing provisions of this chapter do not 
apply to such an adoption. " Section 255 of the Probate Code 
provides: "Every illegitimate child is an heir of his mother, 
and also of the person who, in writing, signed in the presence 
of a competent witness, acknowledges himself to be the father, 
and inherits his or her estate, in whole or in part, as the case 
may be, in the same manner as if he had been born in lawful 
wedlock; but he does not represent his father by inheriting 
any part of the estate of the father's kindred, either lineal or 
collateral, unless, before his death, his parents shall have inter-
married, and his father, after such marriage, acknowledges 
him as his child, or adopts him into his family; in which case 
such child is deemed legitimate for all purposes of succession. 
An illegitimate child may represent his mother and may in-
Iwrit any part of the estate of the mother's kindred either 
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lineal or collateral." The issue, therefore, is whether section 
255 of the Probate Code qualifies section 230 of the Civil Code 
and governs the inheritance of all persons born illegitimate 
,,'hether or not they are subsequently legitimated. 
[2] The cases involving the right of a person born ille-
gitimate to inherit directly from his father have uniformly 
held that section 230 is not qualified by section 255; that the 
two sections provide alternate methods by which a person 
may become the ht'ir of his father. (Estate of Pico, 52 Cal. 
84. 87; In re Jessup, 81 Cal. 408, 421-422 [21 P. 976, 22 P. 
742. 1028. 6 L.R.A. 594] ; Estate of Flood, 217 Cal. 763. 767 
[21 P.2d 579] ; Estate of Lund, 26 Cal.2d 472. 482 [159 P.2d 
643. 162 A.L.R. 606].) [3] It is clear. therefore. that with 
regard to direct inheritance from the father, the words "ille-
gitimate child" in section 255 are applicable. not to every 
child who is born illegitimate, but only to children, born ille-
gitimate, who have not been legitimated under either section 
215 or section 230 of the Civil Code. These words must have 
the same meaning with regard to inheritance through the 
father if their meaning has any consistency. Otherwise the 
restrictive language of section 255- would conflict with the 
provision of section 230 of the Civil Code that a child legiti-
mated by adoption is thereafter "deemed for all purposes 
legitimate," and the provision of section 215 of the Civil Code 
that "A ehild born before wedlock becomes legitimate by the 
subsequent marriage of its parents." A child who is "deemed 
for all purposes legitimate" cannot be regarded as still ille-
gitimate for some purposes, and a child who has become legi-
mate can no longer be regarded as an "illegitimate child." 
The statutes are not in conflict when the words "ille-
gitimate child" are interpreted as referring only to children 
born illegitimate who have not been legitimated under the 
provisions of the Civil Code. Although this interpretation 
renders some of the restrictive language of section 255 super-
fluous, it is supported by the legislative history of the stat-
utes regarding legitimation and inheritance by illegitimates 
as well as the eases involving the rights of direct inheritance 
of those born illegitimate. (See 29 Cal.L.Rev. 185, 187-191.) 
The forerunner of section 255 of the Probate Code was enacted 
." [B]ut he does not represent his father by inheriting any part of 
the estate of the father's kindrt'd, either Iinenl or collateral, unlet!8, before 
his death, hill parents shall have interrnnrried, and his father, after 
such marriage, aclmowledies him &8 his child, or adopts him into hia 
fa.milJr. • • ." 
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in 1850 (Cal. Stats. 1850, pp. 219-220) to provide a 
by which a person born illegitimate could inherit from 
"mother, and if his father forma.1ly acknowledged him, 
inherit from his father, and if his natural parents later 
ried could inherit as a legitimate child. It was not until 
that the forerunners of sections 215 and 230 of the Civil 
were enacted to provide for the legitimation for all nnl<nnll_lI 
of persons born illegitimate. (Cal. Stats.1870, §§ 8-9, 
531.) While thus mitigating further the burdens of lllelnu.·\11 
macy, however, the Legislature repealed the statute of 
(Cal. Stats. 1870, p. 531), the only law by which those 
legitimated under the new statutes could inherit at' all. 
Legislature corrected this error by ineptly including the wh(ilila 
of section 1387 (now Prob. Code, § 255) in the Civil Code 
1872. We do not believe that in reenacting the older n1'llVl.,-S 
sion to restore the rights of those who remained illElgitmuate,;l 
the Legislature intended to limit the effectiveness of the 
sections of the Civil Code derived from the act of 187() under 
whieb a person born illegitimate could attain the status of 
legitimacy for all purposes. The trend of legislation govern-
ing the rights of persons bOrn illegitimate is to give them the· 
same status as those born legitimate. (See BWieccio v. BotMfl, 
27 Cal.2d 621, 626 [165 P.2d 677].) It would be unreasonable, 
to conclude that because the Legislatu1''! readopted an old 
provision made partially obsolete by later legislation to flU 
the gap created by the statutory changes of 1870, it intended' 
to limit the effect of the general legitimation statutes. It' 
would be even more unreasonable to hold that the words un_ . 
legitimate child" appearing in section 255 have one meaning 
when read with the part of the statute providing for direct 
inheritance and another when read with the provision gov-
erning collateral inheritance. Accordingly, those words re-
fer, not to every child who is born illegitimate, but only to such 
children who have not been legitimated under the provisions 
of sections 215 or 230 of the Civil Code. The dictum of this 
court to the contrary in its opinion on denial of hearing in 
WoZfv. GalZ,32 Cal.App. 286 [163 P. 346, 350], is disapproved. 
The judgment is reversed. The appeal from the order deny-
ing petitioner's motion to amend his petition is dismissed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, .J., Schauer, 
J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
